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Message-ID: <CA+5g0SLAHYOi+dd5Wv8a=BOhTK5Fanwb4pZ+Ct9SSKVsHmLAvQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 17:42:59 -0300
From: Felipe Pena <felipensp@...il.com>
To: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
Cc: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, Tomas Hoger <thoger@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: CVE id request: Multiple buffer overflow in unixODBC
2012/5/30 Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> On 05/30/2012 11:40 AM, Felipe Pena wrote:
>> Hi all,
>>
>> 2012/5/30 Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>:
>>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1
>>>
>>> On 05/30/2012 02:07 AM, Tomas Hoger wrote:
>>>> On Tue, 29 May 2012 09:42:42 -0300 Felipe Pena wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Multiple buffer overflow in unixODBC
>>>>> ===========================
>>>>>
>>>>> The library unixODBC doesn't check properly the input from
>>>>> FILEDSN=, DRIVER= options in the DSN, which causes buffer
>>>>> overflow when passed to the SQLDriverConnect() function.
>>>>
>>>> Reports like this - covering bugs in parsing of the
>>>> configuration parameters (i.e. generally trusted input) -
>>>> should include some reasoning why these should be considered
>>>> security. Nothing obvious not intended to break PHP safe_mode
>>>> comes to mind.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Ahh my bad, I misunderstood this to be options that could be
>>> passed by the program as a standard part of the query, and thus
>>> controlled by the attacker. If this is indeed limited to
>>> configuration files and there are not extenuating circumstances
>>> that allow exploitation I will have to REJECT these CVEs.
>>>
>>
>> It isn't limited to the configuration files. Such input can be
>> passed to the `isql' interactive tool that come together unixODBC.
>> The same string can be used to connect through PHP PDO, for
>> example.
>>
>> $ pwd .../unixodbc/src/unixODBC-2.3.1/exe $ ./isql
>> "FILEDSN=$(python -c "print 'A'*10000");UID=user" -k Segmentation
>> fault
>>
>> If it isn't characterized a security issue I'm sorry.
>>
>> Thanks.
>>
>
> Is this something that an attacker can typically control, or does the
> PHP author need to write code that does this?
>
Nop. Beyond the isql one, I can't find a way to control externally the DSN.
--
Regards,
Felipe Pena
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