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Message-ID: <4FC66EDD.7090903@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 13:02:53 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Felipe Pena <felipensp@...il.com>, Tomas Hoger <thoger@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: CVE id request: Multiple buffer overflow in unixODBC

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On 05/30/2012 11:40 AM, Felipe Pena wrote:
> Hi all,
> 
> 2012/5/30 Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>:
>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1
>> 
>> On 05/30/2012 02:07 AM, Tomas Hoger wrote:
>>> On Tue, 29 May 2012 09:42:42 -0300 Felipe Pena wrote:
>>> 
>>>> Multiple buffer overflow in unixODBC
>>>> ===========================
>>>> 
>>>> The library unixODBC doesn't check properly the input from 
>>>> FILEDSN=, DRIVER= options in the DSN, which causes buffer 
>>>> overflow when passed to the SQLDriverConnect() function.
>>> 
>>> Reports like this - covering bugs in parsing of the
>>> configuration parameters (i.e. generally trusted input) -
>>> should include some reasoning why these should be considered
>>> security.  Nothing obvious not intended to break PHP safe_mode
>>> comes to mind.
>>> 
>> 
>> Ahh my bad, I misunderstood this to be options that could be
>> passed by the program as a standard part of the query, and thus
>> controlled by the attacker. If this is indeed limited to
>> configuration files and there are not extenuating circumstances
>> that allow exploitation I will have to REJECT these CVEs.
>> 
> 
> It isn't limited to the configuration files. Such input can be
> passed to the `isql' interactive tool that come together unixODBC.
> The same string can be used to connect through PHP PDO, for
> example.
> 
> $ pwd .../unixodbc/src/unixODBC-2.3.1/exe $ ./isql
> "FILEDSN=$(python -c "print 'A'*10000");UID=user" -k Segmentation
> fault
> 
> If it isn't characterized a security issue I'm sorry.
> 
> Thanks.
> 

Is this something that an attacker can typically control, or does the
PHP author need to write code that does this?

- -- 
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993

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