Follow @Openwall on Twitter for new release announcements and other news
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <ZRXlPoozp5n+cWv1@itl-email>
Date: Thu, 28 Sep 2023 16:42:33 -0400
From: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@...isiblethingslab.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE-2023-5217: Heap buffer overflow in vp8
 encoding in libvpx

On Thu, Sep 28, 2023 at 11:37:23AM -0700, Alan Coopersmith wrote:
> Google has announced another media parsing bug, this time correctly documenting
> both the base library and Chrome versions affected in the CVE.
> 
> https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-5217 states:
> 
>    Heap buffer overflow in vp8 encoding in libvpx in Google Chrome prior to
>    117.0.5938.132 and libvpx 1.13.1 allowed a remote attacker to potentially
>    exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
>    (Chromium security severity: High)
> 
> Unfortunately, the bug report it points to is restricted access still:
> https://crbug.com/1486441
> 
> But the Chrome release notes state:
>    Google is aware that an exploit for CVE-2023-5217 exists in the wild.
> https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2023/09/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_27.html
> 
> Mozilla has put out their own security advisory at
> https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2023-44/
> and delivered fixes in Firefox 118.0.1, Firefox ESR 115.3.1,
> Firefox Focus for Android 118.1, and Firefox for Android 118.1.
> 
> https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1855550 is also still
> restricted access.
> 
> It does not appear that libvpx 1.13.1 has been released yet, but there
> are two commits in its git repo with the 1486441 bug id listed:
> 
> https://github.com/webmproject/libvpx/commit/3fbd1dca6a4d2dad332a2110d646e4ffef36d590
> https://github.com/webmproject/libvpx/commit/af6dedd715f4307669366944cca6e0417b290282
> 
> Mozilla's commit references these two libvpx commit ids as well:
> https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/rev/c53f5ef77b62b79af86951a7f9130e1896b695d2

How long will it take for corporations to accept that writing media
codecs in C, C++, or any other memory-unsafe language is a fundamentally
bad idea, and that it is better to rewrite the codecs in a safe language
(such as Wuffs or Rust) than to try to secure the existing ones?
-- 
Sincerely,
Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers)
Invisible Things Lab

Download attachment "signature.asc" of type "application/pgp-signature" (834 bytes)

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Please check out the Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this mailing list.

Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.