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Message-ID: <08abeba7-4ea5-a8d0-9146-14ecb5acf181@oracle.com> Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2023 15:09:08 -0800 From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@...cle.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, Hanno Böck <hanno@...eck.de> Subject: Re: Directory traversal in sharutils/uudecode and python uu module On 12/21/22 10:42, Hanno Böck wrote: > If one can convince someone with root privileges to decode such a file > this may thus compromise a system. Fortunately, the easiest exploit path was mostly removed decades ago: https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/126 > I got a reply confirming the report from the sharutils developers, > pointing out that this can be interpreted as expected behavior > according to the posix standard. I don't expect a fix any time soon, > their latest release is from 2015. I started a discussion on the Austin Group mailing list to see if the standard should be updated, but the argument has mostly leaned towards "users should either use -o to specify output or look at files before uudecoding them" (along with suggestions to drop these utilities from the standard now in favor of base64 encoding utilities). -- -Alan Coopersmith- alan.coopersmith@...cle.com Oracle Solaris Engineering - https://blogs.oracle.com/solaris
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