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Message-ID: <87zhv5znqn.fsf@oldenburg.str.redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Oct 2018 23:16:00 +0200
From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>
To: Andrew Sandoval <ASandoval@...root.com>
Cc: "oss-security\@lists.openwall.com" <oss-security@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: GCC Compiler Induced Vulnerability - affects programs compiled with GCC 7 and 8 containing nested functions
* Andrew Sandoval:
> Will Webroot communicate this to the public?
> Webroot believes in responsible disclosure and will work with third parties to
> ensure that the vulnerability is addressed before a public announcement. We
> are happy to work with your communications team on announcement timing.
This is already public because oss-security is a public mailing list.
Most GNU/Linux distributions ensure that only very special binaries
(such as some versions of the Ada compiler) enable executable stacks.
In our experience, if the toolchain produces a binary that requests an
executable stack, it is more likely due to manually written assembler
files without the required stack executability markup section, and not
due to nested C functions whose address escapes. Without scanning built
binaries for these discrepancies, such cases could easily be missed.
Please also note that an executable stack is not a vulnerability itself,
and it is not directly exploitable. (The same applies to the lack of
Intel CET support in binaries.)
Thanks,
Florian
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