[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <CANO=Ty2tYv6KAjgrN3fL_YisPSMHQqpSWagEwA+T2Rz15-wGDQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 30 May 2017 09:36:22 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security <oss-security@...ts.openwall.com>
Cc: "Designer, Solar" <solar@...nwall.com>
Subject: Re: Linux kernel: stack buffer overflow with
controlled payload in get_options() function
On Tue, May 30, 2017 at 9:20 AM, Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com> wrote:
> That's not what secure/verified boot means to everyone else, and
> there's nothing in mainline with those properties. To everyone else,
> it's not an arbitrary bureaucratic/marketing feature. It's
> verification of the whole base OS... i.e. Android, Android Things
> (Brillo), ChromeOS, iOS and sane embedded Linux systems. Likely
> Windows on mobile devices too, and I really doubt that Microsoft
> doesn't plan on verifying the userspace OS if they don't already.
>
Red Hat is only associated with this in so far as I happen to work for Red
Hat and I typically do the CVE assignments on the distros@ list (where this
issue was initially reported).
>
> Anyway, good luck with meaningless Red Hat security theatre. These
> "vulnerabilities" are just reinforcing the view that security people
> are foolish. There isn't disagreement that it's a meaningless feature
> with this level of incompleteness and yet a CVE is assigned for it?
> Okay then...
>
I suggest you take this issue up with MITRE/CVE Board (disclaimer: I'm also
on the CVE Board), they control CVE and the definitions of what is CVE
worthy, and in this case it largely falls under the "advertised/implied
security feature doesn't work as such". This is unlikely to change as it's
well established and has been used for over a decade.
>
> Sorry for thinking that this should be about something more than
> padding CVs and marketing materials.
>
I suggest then you take this up with the original researcher if you're
worried about people padding their CVs. This discussion isn't
productive/helpful and I suggest you take it off list.
--
Kurt Seifried -- Red Hat -- Product Security -- Cloud
PGP A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
Red Hat Product Security contact: secalert@...hat.com
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Please check out the
Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this
mailing list.
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
