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Message-ID: <0133192437e54518a5616bc3c8d074e2@imshyb01.MITRE.ORG> Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2017 11:33:57 -0500 From: <cve-assign@...re.org> To: <nathan.van.gheem@...ne.org> CC: <cve-assign@...re.org>, <oss-security@...ts.openwall.com> Subject: Re: CVE Request: Plone Sandbox escape vulnerability -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 > [] Accessing private content via `str.format` in through-the-web templates > and scripts. See this blog post by Armin Ronacher ( > http://lucumr.pocoo.org/2016/12/29/careful-with-str-format/) for the > general idea. Since the `format` method was introduced in Python 2.6, this > part of the hotfix is only relevant for Plone 4 and 5, not Plone 3. > Credit: Plone security team, Armin Ronacher > Reference: https://plone.org/security/hotfix/20170117/sandbox-escape > > Versions Affected: > 4.3.11 and any earlier 4.x version, 5.0.6 and any earlier 5.x version > > Code fixes: > https://pypi.python.org/pypi/Products.PloneHotfix20170117 Use CVE-2017-5524. The scope of this CVE does not include the "reflected Cross Site Scripting attack (XSS) in the ZMI (manage_findResult)" mentioned on the PloneHotfix20170117 page. If that still needs a CVE ID, please let us know. In the http://lucumr.pocoo.org/2016/12/29/careful-with-str-format/ post, the exploitation scenarios are: > untrusted translators on string files. This is a big one because > many applications that are translated into multiple languages will > use new-style Python string formatting and not everybody will vet > all the strings that come in. We do not feel that a CVE would have been needed if this were the only exploitation scenario. We do not think there is a security boundary between "people who can contribute arbitrary code to a product" and "people who can contribute code that expresses translations." However, it is possible that an open-source project exists somewhere with a completely untrusted channel for translators. > user exposed configuration. One some systems users might be > permitted to configure some behavior and that might be exposed as > format strings. In particular I have seen it where users can > configure notification mails, log message formats or other basic > templates in web applications. This one seems completely valid, and might be the primary exploitation scenario for CVE-2017-5524. - -- CVE Assignment Team M/S M300, 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA [ A PGP key is available for encrypted communications at http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJYf5iGAAoJEHb/MwWLVhi27kcQAJHT6gBPBNBX+bevBoRdfS2h NtBgjZrd1s2KVCPnCdZGfnayAFz4nhtaSPul1riqH4on/krV9QkxZmRXxV/8R8ic IfmTWjg4DRuzYYwSGKKhrlNQa4OVWFVT/us4Rv4XDJwPTOXpf5qKFGjisp7udw8i SmFFTEYUV6r26ons2Q5u5RQenmiml3gdiS48XTQ5RFVXRNRKpCeswM1E+kG+S6bV G4Bx8QYUcRvCrRV2W1gEEjxBiI65FyOBQTX3jDg/N7DSn9v4dX4gZaSrbUaHIqLB YAzuTD4liH/G3ABAUQf3C2uiGEYbDUjGb4v5DFptcGr+xHMx3gtak3sJS+BS2mXq nrClrpO9BBoYFgQxV6QRTAEpuDoiAfcv6lB/Uj4/90Ub+hrqf94uqyS6XlGzyaxq r8kWPiVuUf8YbUVfT5H5YSeRZVH1gMK16Mci/4EWw3Al25CuK+HwrIZT/oA7ljez BL+zGzDGMPoIsHmge+PIS9yEbRvZ05Bim8p4yCE/0nFpWhipALEhNshADgVpkLME 338NhrrW1fyNQoOCggacrcHp51hqpaAVRzJ5yM8DTmMz+SmAGhq2vemqFageQkyr B+P3VsnBCEFofULAXPgYYN1+Ub4tkWaO3enYCZ2YJIFe/Zj6ysKLnEW42l2edRNz T2eqS7U/9gxzMdHRkqIn =97Au -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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