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Message-ID: <1477914064.3558.4.camel@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2016 07:41:04 -0400
From: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>
To: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: Stack guard canary massaging
On Mon, 2016-10-31 at 12:22 +0100, Solar Designer wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 31, 2016 at 11:48:45AM +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:
> > Sorry for cross-posting.
>
> Sorry to bikeshed, but I think this isn't a kernel-hardening topic at
> all, so the thread should continue on oss-security only, please.
>
> Florian, if there's a reason why you think it's kernel-hardening
> related, please let me know. To me, it looks like userspace hardening
> that is not even kernel-assisted (at least not directly in this place,
> even though the kernel may have helped provide the random numbers).
>
> If your cross-posting was to reach more of the right people, then you
> have already done so, and they can join oss-security now. ;-)
>
> Alexander
The kernel supports SSP but it doesn't appear to do the same thing.
arch/*/include/asm/stackprotector.h
Why do the non-x86 implementations XOR in LINUX_VERSION_CODE though? Is
it supposed to be a placeholder for a random at compile-time value? :\
It's not harmful but that's just... weird.
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