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Message-Id: <20160926175302.D6C8417FDAB@rebar.astron.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Sep 2016 13:53:02 -0400
From: christos@...las.com (Christos Zoulas)
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE-2016-7545 -- SELinux sandbox escape

On Sep 26,  6:54pm, jwilk@...lk.net (Jakub Wilk) wrote:
-- Subject: Re: [oss-security] CVE-2016-7545 -- SELinux sandbox escape

| Are there any use cases for TIOCSTI other than producing exploits?

On the BSDs TIOCSTI has been limited to the superuser since the
4.4BSD Lite 2 release in 1995 (IIRC). I think that linux should
follow suit if it has not (yet). For those who are interested in
the history of this, I believe that first we checked only the
userid (4.2BSD), then we checked the userid and that the process
was a session leader (4.3BSD), and finally we decided that this
was too big of a hole and limited it to the superuser.

christos

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