[<prev] [next>] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20160719093915.GA29047@suse.de>
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 11:39:15 +0200
From: Sebastian Krahmer <krahmer@...e.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: ebiederm@...ssion.com
Subject: subuid security patches for shadow package
Hi
The shadow package contains newuidmap and newgidmap suid
binaries in order to allow users to take advantage of the
userns feature of uid-mappings.
I added patches here:
https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=979282
they consist of:
1) Removing getlogin() to find out about users.
It relies on utmp, which is not a trusted base of info (group writable).
2) Cleaning up UID retrieval and computation. The 'long long' code was
totally unclear to me, as the numbers are converted to ulong right
afterwards anyway. Additionally there was a *int overflow*, which can be
tested via 'newuidmap $$ 0 10000 -1' (given that 10000 is listed as allowed)
which produces no error but tries to write large "count" values to the uid_map
file. Kernel may check for overflows itself, but it should not be allowed
by a suid binary to be written in the first place.
Theoretically theres also a TOCTOU issue in newuidmap, since the
st_uid fields of the stat on /proc/pid may change over time
(suid being executed), but to my analsysis such twists have no gain
for the attacker.
Patch should be tested by upstream, since I am not sure what the
getlogin() code (shared uids??) was about at all.
Sebastian
--
~ perl self.pl
~ $_='print"\$_=\47$_\47;eval"';eval
~ krahmer@...e.com - SuSE Security Team
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Please check out the
Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this
mailing list.
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
