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Message-Id: <20151103200523.E8C2272E00E@smtpvbsrv1.mitre.org>
Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2015 15:05:23 -0500 (EST)
From: cve-assign@...re.org
To: kristian.fiskerstrand@...ptuouscapital.com
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE Request: pycurl use after free fixed in version 7.19.5.2
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> https://github.com/pycurl/pycurl/commit/602f8e364634d386524f0396e962c2c9de0536a9
>
> my understanding is that use-after-free generally gets assigned a CVE
> based on CWE 416
There isn't that type of direct relationship between the existence of
a CWE ID and the availability of a CVE ID for an instance of the
weakness. CVE, for example, involves additional decision points about
whether the weakness is a mistake (here, yes) and about whether the
weakness is exploitable in a way that crosses a privilege boundary
(here, possibly not). It's also necessary that the vulnerability
existed in something akin to "shipped code." The patch seems to be
possibly related to "PyTuple" and the ChangeLog has "List and tuples
are now accepted in all positions of HTTPPOST option values" for the
same version. If the problem only existed in unshipped code between
7.19.5.1 and 7.19.5.2 as tuple support was being developed, then it
typically would not have a CVE ID.
> I haven't looked into the code in any detail for exploitability
Anyone is welcome to provide additional analysis. We can accept a
threat model in which a Python script allows an untrusted person to
control the string data for properly formed setopt calls. We probably
can't accept an implausible threat model in which a Python script
allows an untrusted person to make improperly formed setopt calls.
- --
CVE assignment team, MITRE CVE Numbering Authority
M/S M300
202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ PGP key available through http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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