oss-security - Re: Healing the bash fork

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Message-ID: <CALx_OUCwUaQP6cxOt_9KkRSNPERdmv4NZ81Rn7BNa_=By_AXkQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Sep 2014 07:27:48 -0700
From: Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@...edump.cx>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Healing the bash fork

> Florian's prefix/suffix patch is not going to protect against the setuid/setgid exploit that I reported to this list last week.
>
> I discuss the setuid/setgid vulnerability at the following site, including demonstrating how Florian's prefix/suffix patch provides no protection:
>
> http://technicalprose.blogspot.co.uk/2014/09/shellshock-bug-third-vulnerability.html

You do realize that your setuid program is patently unsafe, right? Say:

$ echo -e '#!/bin/sh\necho pwn3d' >date;chmod 755 date;PATH=.:$PWD
./setuid_program
pwn3d

/mz

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