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Message-ID: <CALx_OUDWD2FoneQ6hwGG5cjaN+jHFNPgW2xeZ47OrBzVT3MT+Q@mail.gmail.com> Date: Mon, 29 Sep 2014 07:45:22 -0700 From: Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@...edump.cx> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Cc: Chester Ramey <chet.ramey@...e.edu> Subject: Re: Re: CVE-2014-6271: remote code execution through bash (3rd vulnerability) > Am I the only one who is wondering: Who is paying Chet to do this? Chet probably had a busy couple of weeks because of a piece of code that went unnoticed for longer than the age of some people posting to this list. As soon as additional problems with the original fix cropped up, he also worked pretty hard to adopt a more robust prefix approach, which shipped upstream about a day ago. While I'd be the first to line up and just get rid of the affected functionality, the worries about compatibility with existing code are pretty valid. Heck, we unexpectedly bumped into issues with that when fixing the bug at Google. We were surprised to notice that some people do use function exports in their code, and then, that some of them use mock object-oriented notation like function foo::bar { ... } - which actually malfunctioned after the first patch. So, I don't think there's a lot of value in making random accusations. /mz
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