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Message-ID: <CAOp4FwS3REpdEUA=iUb+tJ1N7-05K8mtd_k8mmso-0KOOrj2UA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 28 Sep 2014 08:36:19 +0400
From: Loganaden Velvindron <loganaden@...il.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: chet.ramey@...e.edu
Subject: Re: Re: CVE-2014-6271: remote code execution through
bash (3rd vulnerability)
On Fri, Sep 26, 2014 at 6:13 PM, Christos Zoulas <christos@...las.com> wrote:
> On Sep 26, 1:47pm, john.haxby@...cle.com (John Haxby) wrote:
> -- Subject: Re: [oss-security] Re: CVE-2014-6271: remote code execution throu
>
> | It's not so much the known attacks -- redefining ls, unset, command,
> | typeset, declare, etc -- it's the future parser bugs that we don't yet
> | know about.
> |
> | A friend of mine said this could be a vulnerability gift that keeps on
> | giving.
>
> I think that at this point the conservative approach is best, so
> until the bash author figures what the best solution is, the feature
> is disabled by default for NetBSD. It is not wise to expose bash's
> parser to the internet and then debug it live while being attacked.
>
> christos
>
> $NetBSD: patch-shell.c,v 1.1 2014/09/25 20:28:32 christos Exp $
>
> Add flag to disable importing of function unless explicitly enabled
>
> --- shell.c.christos 2014-01-14 08:04:32.000000000 -0500
> +++ shell.c 2014-09-25 16:11:51.000000000 -0400
> @@ -229,6 +229,7 @@
> #else
> int posixly_correct = 0; /* Non-zero means posix.2 superset. */
> #endif
> +int import_functions = 0; /* Import functions from environment */
>
> /* Some long-winded argument names. These are obviously new. */
> #define Int 1
> @@ -248,6 +249,7 @@
> { "help", Int, &want_initial_help, (char **)0x0 },
> { "init-file", Charp, (int *)0x0, &bashrc_file },
> { "login", Int, &make_login_shell, (char **)0x0 },
> + { "import-functions", Int, &import_functions, (char **)0x0 },
> { "noediting", Int, &no_line_editing, (char **)0x0 },
> { "noprofile", Int, &no_profile, (char **)0x0 },
> { "norc", Int, &no_rc, (char **)0x0 },
>
> $NetBSD: patch-variables.c,v 1.1 2014/09/25 20:28:32 christos Exp $
>
> Only read functions from environment if flag is set.
>
> --- variables.c.christos 2014-09-25 16:09:41.000000000 -0400
> +++ variables.c 2014-09-25 16:12:10.000000000 -0400
> @@ -105,6 +105,7 @@
> extern int assigning_in_environment;
> extern int executing_builtin;
> extern int funcnest_max;
> +extern int import_functions;
>
> #if defined (READLINE)
> extern int no_line_editing;
> @@ -349,7 +350,7 @@
>
> /* If exported function, define it now. Don't import functions from
> the environment in privileged mode. */
> - if (privmode == 0 && read_but_dont_execute == 0 && STREQN ("() {", string, 4))
> + if (import_functions && privmode == 0 && read_but_dont_execute == 0 && STREQN ("() {", string, 4))
> {
> string_length = strlen (string);
> temp_string = (char *)xmalloc (3 + string_length + char_index);
I agree: This should be disabled until a proper solution is found.
--
This message is strictly personal and the opinions expressed do not
represent those of my employers, either past or present.
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