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Message-Id: <201407172231.s6HMVeS9019777@linus.mitre.org>
Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 18:31:40 -0400 (EDT)
From: cve-assign@...re.org
To: larry0@...com
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Vulnerability Report for Ruby Gem codders-dataset-1.3.2.1 (etc.)

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>   Vulnerability Report for Ruby Gem codders-dataset-1.3.2.1
> codders-dataset-1.3.2.1/lib/dataset/database/mysql.rb
> Lines 18 and 24 expose the password to the process table
> 
> codders-dataset-1.3.2.1/lib/dataset/database/postgresql.rb
> Lines 18 and 24 expose the password to the process table

Use CVE-2014-4991 for both the mysql.rb issue and the postgresql.rb issue.



>   Vulnerability Report for Ruby Gem cap-strap-0.1.5

> the password is exposed to the process table listing

Use CVE-2014-4992.


> The password crypt hash is also going to have the same 'sa' salt every time.

There is no CVE ID for this. It is not known why the code "print
crypt(#{password}, salt)" was used. This Gem has a very small amount
of code and it is unclear whether commonly favored security features
such as multiple possible salts were even within the scope of the
development effort. In general, one interpretation of
"crypt(#{password}, salt)" is intentionally unfinished code. Another
interpretation (which probably could have a CVE ID) is accidentally
unfinished code.



>   Vulnerability Report for Ruby Gem backup-agoddard-3.0.28
>   Vulnerability Report for Ruby Gem backup_checksum-3.0.23
> Lines 178 exposes the password to the process table

The vulnerable parts of these two Gems seem to be direct copies of
code from something called "The Backup Ruby Gem" and thus the
codebases are not independent.

Use CVE-2014-4993 for the report about both backup-agoddard and
backup_checksum.



>   Vulnerability Report for Ruby Gem gyazo-1.0.0
> file names are time based and predictable
> /tmp/gyazo_upload_#{Time.now.to_i}_#{Time.now.usec}.png

Use CVE-2014-4994.



>   Vulnerability Report for Ruby Gem VladTheEnterprising-0.2
 
> The mysql root password can be read out of /tmp/my.cnf.#{target_host}
> if a local user waits to read that after it is written and before it
> is removed

Use CVE-2014-4995.


> It is also possible to clobber files owned by the VladTheEnterprising
> user process via symlink attack

Use CVE-2014-4996.



>   Vulnerability Report for Ruby Gem gnms-2.1.1
> 
> can lead to remote command injection if a malicious user specifies an
> IP address with shell meta characters

There is currently no CVE ID for this. Initial inspection of the
source code doesn't suggest an opportunity for a malicious user to
cross privilege boundaries.



>  Vulnerability Report for Ruby Gem point-cli-0.0.1
> Line 19 exposes the username and password combination to the process table.

Use CVE-2014-4997.



>   Vulnerability Report for Ruby Gem kompanee-recipes-0.1.4

There is currently no CVE ID for this, for the two independent reasons
mentioned in the http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2014/07/11/9
post.



>   Vulnerability Report for Ruby Gem lean-ruport-0.3.8
> Line 21 exposes the mysql password to the process table

Use CVE-2014-4998.



>   Vulnerability Report for Ruby Gem kajam-1.0.3.rc2
> Lines 18 and 24 expose the mysql user password to the process table

Use CVE-2014-4999.



>   Vulnerability Report for Ruby Gem lawn-login-0.0.7
> Line 24 exposes the password to the process table

Use CVE-2014-5000.



>   Vulnerability Report for Ruby Gem kcapifony-2.1.6
> Lines 482, 484, 522 and 524 expose the password to the process table

Use CVE-2014-5001.



>   Vulnerability Report for Ruby Gem karo-2.3.8

The documentation says "Karo is released as a Ruby Gem. The gem is to
be installed within a Ruby on Rails application." However, the attack
in question apparently doesn't cross privilege boundaries. One of the
examples is:

  karo vim app/models/user.rb # Will open the user.rb file on the server using vim

It appears that there is no motivation for a user to rely on "passes
unsanitized user supplied input to the command line". The user can use
a :! within vim instead.



>   Vulnerability Report for Ruby Gem lynx-0.2.0

> Ruby command line wrapper for MySQL.

> Exposes password to the process table

Use CVE-2014-5002.


> Doesn't properly sanitize user input before sending to command line:
>       def perform(command)
>         system(command.to_s)

We weren't able to establish that this attack crosses privilege boundaries.
Given that the input is intentionally being used for a "system" call,
we aren't sure what restrictions would be imposed by the "sanitize
user input" recommendation.



>   Vulnerability Report for Ruby Gem ciborg-3.0.0
> There is a /tmp file race condition when creating /tmp/perlbrew-installer

Use CVE-2014-5003.



>   Vulnerabilities in Ruby Gem brbackup-0.1.1

> The following code exposes the database password to the command line

Use CVE-2014-5004.


> line 313 is vulnerable to SQL injection via the '#{name}' variable.

>   opts.banner = "Usage: brbackup [-flag] [argument]"
>   opts.define_head "brbackup: clone db backups across environments"

We didn't immediately see a scenario in which #{name} comes from
untrusted user input. Thus, there is currently no CVE ID for a
SQL injection issue.

- -- 
CVE assignment team, MITRE CVE Numbering Authority
M/S M300
202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ PGP key available through http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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