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Message-ID: <20140624115154.GC26703@suse.de>
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2014 13:51:54 +0200
From: Marcus Meissner <meissner@...e.de>
To: OSS Security List <oss-security@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: CVE Request: Linux kernel ALSA core control API vulnerabilities
Hi folks,
Several ALSA fixes have been committed to the Linux kernel git that fix several
use-after-free and out-of-bounds memory access vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel.
These will need CVEs.
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/sound/core/control.c?id=07f4d9d74a04aa7c72c5dae0ef97565f28f17b92
Author: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@...afoo.de>
Date: Wed Jun 18 13:32:31 2014 +0200
ALSA: control: Protect user controls against concurrent access
The user-control put and get handlers as well as the tlv do not protect against
concurrent access from multiple threads. Since the state of the control is not
updated atomically it is possible that either two write operations or a write
and a read operation race against each other. Both can lead to arbitrary memory
disclosure. This patch introduces a new lock that protects user-controls from
concurrent access. Since applications typically access controls sequentially
than in parallel a single lock per card should be fine.
(memory information disclosure or even overwrite)
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/sound/core/control.c?id=82262a46627bebb0febcc26664746c25cef08563
commit 82262a46627bebb0febcc26664746c25cef08563
Author: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@...afoo.de>
Date: Wed Jun 18 13:32:32 2014 +0200
ALSA: control: Fix replacing user controls
There are two issues with the current implementation for replacing user
controls. The first is that the code does not check if the control is actually a
user control and neither does it check if the control is owned by the process
that tries to remove it. That allows userspace applications to remove arbitrary
controls, which can cause a user after free if a for example a driver does not
expect a control to be removed from under its feed.
The second issue is that on one hand when a control is replaced the
user_ctl_count limit is not checked and on the other hand the user_ctl_count is
increased (even though the number of user controls does not change). This allows
userspace, once the user_ctl_count limit as been reached, to repeatedly replace
a control until user_ctl_count overflows. Once that happens new controls can be
added effectively bypassing the user_ctl_count limit.
Both issues can be fixed by instead of open-coding the removal of the control
that is to be replaced to use snd_ctl_remove_user_ctl(). This function does
proper permission checks as well as decrements user_ctl_count after the control
has been removed.
Note that by using snd_ctl_remove_user_ctl() the check which returns -EBUSY at
beginning of the function if the control already exists is removed. This is not
a problem though since the check is quite useless, because the lock that is
protecting the control list is released between the check and before adding the
new control to the list, which means that it is possible that a different
control with the same settings is added to the list after the check. Luckily
there is another check that is done while holding the lock in snd_ctl_add(), so
we'll rely on that to make sure that the same control is not added twice.
(user after free)
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/sound/core/control.c?id=fd9f26e4eca5d08a27d12c0933fceef76ed9663d
commit fd9f26e4eca5d08a27d12c0933fceef76ed9663d
Author: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@...afoo.de>
Date: Wed Jun 18 13:32:33 2014 +0200
ALSA: control: Don't access controls outside of protected regions
A control that is visible on the card->controls list can be freed at any time.
This means we must not access any of its memory while not holding the
controls_rw_lock. Otherwise we risk a use after free access.
(use after free)
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/sound/core/control.c?id=ac902c112d90a89e59916f751c2745f4dbdbb4bd
ac902c112d90a89e59916f751c2745f4dbdbb4bd
Author: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@...afoo.de>
Date: Wed Jun 18 13:32:34 2014 +0200
ALSA: control: Handle numid overflow
Each control gets automatically assigned its numids when the control is created.
The allocation is done by incrementing the numid by the amount of allocated
numids per allocation. This means that excessive creation and destruction of
controls (e.g. via SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_ELEM_ADD/REMOVE) can cause the id to
eventually overflow. Currently when this happens for the control that caused the
overflow kctl->id.numid + kctl->count will also over flow causing it to be
smaller than kctl->id.numid. Most of the code assumes that this is something
that can not happen, so we need to make sure that it won't happen
(unknown breakage?)
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/sound/core/control.c?id=883a1d49f0d77d30012f114b2e19fc141beb3e8e
commit 883a1d49f0d77d30012f114b2e19fc141beb3e8e
Author: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@...afoo.de>
Date: Wed Jun 18 13:32:35 2014 +0200
ALSA: control: Make sure that id->index does not overflow
The ALSA control code expects that the range of assigned indices to a control is
continuous and does not overflow. Currently there are no checks to enforce this.
If a control with a overflowing index range is created that control becomes
effectively inaccessible and unremovable since snd_ctl_find_id() will not be
able to find it. This patch adds a check that makes sure that controls with a
overflowing index range can not be created.
(denial of service/memory leak?)
Ciao, Marcus
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