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Message-Id: <201406162018.s5GKIHIF001353@linus.mitre.org> Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2014 16:18:17 -0400 (EDT) From: cve-assign@...re.org To: jordi@...ranet.cat Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: CVE request: monitorix: HTTP server 'handle_request()' session fixation & XSS vulnerabilities (clearing up confusion) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 (In MITRE internal discussions, we noted that CVE mappings for the December 2013 oss-security Monitorix thread unfortunately were not resolved. We acknowledge that this is not a timely response.) > Following the suggestion from Brian Martin (Open Security Foundation), I > write here to try to clear up things related to the latest security > vulnerabilities that affected the Monitorix built-in HTTP server. http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2013/12/27/7 refers to https://github.com/mikaku/Monitorix/issues/30 and the first comment in issue #30 has this quoted text: The remote host is running a web server that fails to adequately sanitize request strings of malicious JavaScript. By leveraging this issue, an attacker may be able to inject arbitrary cookies. Depending on the structure of the web application, it may be possible to launch a 'session fixation' attack using this mechanism. Apparently related to this, http://osvdb.org/100425 says: Monitorix contains a flaw in the HTTP server's handle_request() function that allows a remote, user-assisted attacker to conduct a session fixation attack. This flaw exists because the application, when establishing a new session, does not invalidate an existing session identifier and assign a new one. With a specially crafted request fixating the session identifier, a context-dependent attacker can ensure a user authenticates with the known session identifier, allowing the session to be subsequently hijacked. Looking at https://github.com/mikaku/Monitorix/blob/master/lib/HTTPServer.pm suggests a stateless web application that relies on HTTP Basic Authentication. There are no session identifiers of the type mentioned in http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/384.html and we don't see a rationale for mapping any observed Monitorix behavior to the "CWE-384: Session Fixation" concept. http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2013/12/27/7 also says: These two security vulnerabilities fixed in 3.4.0 were described as "Web Server Generic Cookie Injection" and "Web Server Generic XSS" "Cookie Injection" isn't terminology used in MITRE's CVE or CWE project. Also, https://github.com/mikaku/Monitorix/blob/master/lib/HTTPServer.pm doesn't show any use of cookies. We think that Cookie Injection means that, if an attacker requests a URI beginning with /<SCRIPT>document.cookie= then the unpatched Monitorix code would have produced an HTML document containing that SCRIPT element. In CVE's terminology and practices, this is considered a behavior that is resultant from XSS. http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2013/12/12/8 says: For the XSS issue for the PATH_INFO (aka the $url variable), fixed in 3.4.0, use CVE-2013-7071. The reason that we used the PATH_INFO terminology is the line "my $url = $cgi->path_info();" in the https://github.com/mikaku/Monitorix/blob/master/lib/HTTPServer.pm code. We feel that that terminology choice is not critical because we are not going to have multiple CVEs for issues fixed in 3.4.0. http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2013/12/12/8 also says: For the other issue (the unspecified issue of the "two security issues") fixed in 3.4.0, use CVE-2013-7072. We will be moving CVE-2013-7072 to the "REJECT" state because that CVE assignment came only from an interpretation of the "3.4.0 version released" section of http://www.monitorix.org/news.html before that section was rewritten. From the perspective of CVE content decisions, there can be only one CVE assignment for what was fixed in 3.4.0. The primary vulnerability type is XSS, and the CVE ID for that is CVE-2013-7071. - -- CVE assignment team, MITRE CVE Numbering Authority M/S M300 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA [ PGP key available through http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.14 (SunOS) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJTn073AAoJEKllVAevmvmser0H/ize4lzXSh89Af+fqPp6s6oJ UFXbzv61MHbhXUWQgS1lYxEDmzwMsxTKZbnnn3/r2/N3KeXE2ikM6ZREgRJxKhpb 9U3PRLy0G6rRKT/wzhQsLSl0q/sh6+J7ZuUOQXSLEsEej6iWU4zvtgnNsy7CoQRS oBjP75EJ71Vd+/KaWYHkmy+T910okiqFqBzIIN/+MKK4ojjaqbSG4DaMsspB2ndR /CRa2DRVjVDCifJVNnJZmaFBf6H12W+08oGmizR5ETvH+dnmTufc2jYv6/Z2UTUQ seJU2FFIx7Dmwhjeyaoh+MdOCl67+H+BkzsBsiOExbo9+uQQmp0keo1Disi+Wbc= =9+3S -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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