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Message-ID: <87oazlnxtv.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>
Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2014 19:55:08 +0200
From: Florian Weimer <fw@...eb.enyo.de>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: super unchecked setuid (CVE-2014-0470)
Robert's patch, reproduced below, has all the details.
From: Robert Luberda <robert@...ian.org>
Date: Wed, 23 Apr 2014 00:28:19 +0200
Subject: 14 Fix unchecked setuid call
Fix the following issue noticed by John Lightsey:
super.c does an unchecked setuid(getuid()) when the -F flag
is supplied pointing to a configuration file to test. This opens
super up to the RLIM_NPROC style exploits on 2.6 kernels.
The issue was assigned number CVE-2014-0470.
---
super.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/super.c b/super.c
index abea061..1c21886 100644
--- a/super.c
+++ b/super.c
@@ -849,7 +849,9 @@ by `-o %s' is overridden by file `%s'", *o_file, superfile);
* to the real uid.
*/
if (getuid() != 0) {
- setuid(getuid());
+ if (setuid(getuid()) == -1)
+ Error(1, 1, "Can't set uid to %d: ", getuid());
+
fprintf(stderr,
"\t** Since you have supplied a super.tab file that isn't the default,\n");
fprintf(stderr,
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