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Message-Id: <201402192212.s1JMCmvN011265@linus.mitre.org>
Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2014 17:12:48 -0500 (EST)
From: cve-assign@...re.org
To: ppandit@...hat.com
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE request New-djbdns: dnscache: possible DoS
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> dnscache(8) resolver reads messages over a TCP connection one byte at a time.
> For long messages, it'll trigger as many read(2) calls as the length of a
> message. Thus consuming extra CPU cycles. A malicious remote user could use
> this to cause a DoS.
> https://github.com/pjps/ndjbdns/commit/a67293ce12832b55ec4271536282290ed17863f6
Changing the TCP read approach can be considered a performance
improvement (and, somewhat marginally, a security improvement), with
no CVE assignment. The commit mentions "making slight gain in
performance" and "could also lead to potential denial of service." The
original implementation might have chosen its approach for
design-for-auditability reasons, i.e., it may not have been a
"mistake" at all. It seems impractical to assign CVE IDs to all
opportunities to speed up the processing of untrusted input in all
products. The situation would be different if it were clearly a logic
error in the code, e.g., processing the first byte once, the second
byte four times, the third byte nine times, etc.
- --
CVE assignment team, MITRE CVE Numbering Authority
M/S M300
202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ PGP key available through http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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