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Message-ID: <520E51B0.8000907@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2013 10:22:08 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, Kurt Seifried <kseifrie@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: CVE Request: linux-kernel priviledge escalation
on ARM/perf
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Hash: SHA1
On 08/16/2013 05:07 AM, Petr Matousek wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 05:37:32PM -0400, Vince Weaver wrote:
>> Hello
>>
>> I'm not really a security researcher, so hopefully I'm reporting
>> this in the proper way.
>
> Thank you for the report, Vince. I think that it is completely fine
> -)
>
>> I have a fuzzer tool for the perf_event_open() syscall that
>> found a few oopses on the ARM platform, which I reported to lkml
>> a week ago.
>>
>> One of the oopses can lead to a local privilege escalation on
>> ARM-perf. This fix can be found here:
>> http://www.arm.linux.org.uk/developer/patches/viewpatch.php?id=7809/1
>>
>>
The discussion thread is:
>> https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/8/7/259
>>
>> The hope is this appears in 3.11-rc6 but my attempts to get the
>> people at security@...r.kernel.org to take this seriously didn't
>> really go very well.
>>
>> I do have code that will exploit the kernel and give me a root
>> shell on an ARM Pandaboard machine running 3.11-rc4. The exploit
>> is a bit fragile though: + Only works on ARM + Elevates from
>> normal user to root, no special config required. perf_event
>> syscalls run as regular users, not sure why some think you need
>> root. + It does need a user-mappable address at an exact byte
>> offset from a pmu_struct in memory. This limits things somewhat;
>> in my testing 3.11-rc kernels have INT_MIN at exactly the right
>> place but the exploit doesn't work on a 3.7.6 kernel, it just
>> oopses or crashes the machine.
>
> This looks valid to me. Unless someone has any objections, can you
> please Kurt assign CVE to this issue?
>
> Thanks,
>
Please use CVE-2013-4254 for this issue.
- --
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
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