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Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.00.1302280014370.30582@twin.jikos.cz>
Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2013 00:28:48 +0100 (CET)
From: Jiri Kosina <jikos@...os.cz>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE request - Linux kernel: VFAT slab-based buffer
overflow
On Wed, 27 Feb 2013, Greg KH wrote:
> > May I just bluntly call out shenanigans here? Yes, some bugs are
> > esoteric and it's not immediately obvious that they are security
> > related. But there are so many bugs that are _clearly_
> > security-related.
>
> Really? Ok then, please go ahead and try doing this yourself if you
> feel it is so "obvious" to do.
What Jason is asking for (at least to my understanding) is that if we are
fixing a bug from a known-to-automatically-be-security-issue, we let the
world know explicitly.
We are not pro-actively doing that now, are we?
Yes, there are going to be lots and lots of bugs which turn out to be
security issues once analyzed by super-smart guys wearing their
darker-coloured hats, and that's unavoidable.
Killing all the efforts that try to mitigate this effect with as little
investments as possible seems to be slightly counter-productive though.
We are not going to be perfect at it, ever, sure. Perfect is the enemy of
good.
Also, defining the list in a sensible way is challenging of course, but
let's have this for starters:
- use-after-free
- null(+epsilon) pointer dereference
- array access overflow
- signedness problem in sizeof() with argument coming from userspace
- operating VMAs without mmap_sem
- ...
Hmm?
--
Jiri Kosina
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