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Message-Id: <33972CB6-DA72-4F08-8164-1616291796D8@b3nji.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2013 14:59:17 +0000
From: Benji <me@...ji.com>
To: "oss-security@...ts.openwall.com" <oss-security@...ts.openwall.com>
Cc: "oss-security@...ts.openwall.com" <oss-security@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: CVE request - Linux kernel: VFAT slab-based buffer overflow

Ah the logic. Open source software, hidden secret hush hush no public reporting patches.

Sent from my iPhone

On 27 Feb 2013, at 14:48, Greg KH <greg@...ah.com> wrote:

> On Wed, Feb 27, 2013 at 07:31:30AM +0100, Petr Matousek wrote:
>> On Tue, Feb 26, 2013 at 09:03:46PM -0800, Greg KH wrote:
>>> On Tue, Feb 26, 2013 at 11:41:53PM -0500, Michael Gilbert wrote:
>>>> Anyway, on a more serious note, at some point, acceptance will look
>>>> something like a real kernel-sec team that does essentially what you
>>>> just did, but on a continual basis: reviewing most/all commits for
>>>> potential security concerns and forwarding them to oss-sec to increase
>>>> identification and awareness to be applied downstream.
>>> 
>>> I will say flat out that this is an impossible task to accomplish.
>>> 
>>> As proof of that, I suggest you do this for just one major kernel
>>> release cycle (2-3 months long).
>>> 
>>> You do know the number of patches applied to the Linux kernel every
>>> hour, right?
>>> 
>>> Would you have caught the patch that started this thread?  I sure
>>> didn't, and I was the one who originally applied it to the kernel tree
>>> in the first place.  Doing "root-cause" research for every patch is
>>> non-trivial, as I know you realize.
>> 
>> For starters, security@...nel.org submissions should be posted to
>> oss-security or any other security related public mailing list when the
>> patch is being committed.
> 
> That's not going to happen, and you know that, to do so would be totally
> irresponsible of us and directly harm your users.  That's what
> vendor-sec (or whatever it is called now) is for.  Hasn't that been
> happening for a while now, or has no one been notifying that list of
> these issues?
> 
> greg k-h

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