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Message-ID: <4FC4BE70.7000608@oracle.com> Date: Tue, 29 May 2012 13:17:52 +0100 From: John Haxby <john.haxby@...cle.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com CC: Marcus Meissner <meissner@...e.de> Subject: Re: CVE Request (2002): Linux TCP stack could accept invalid TCP flag combinations On 03/02/12 10:37, Marcus Meissner wrote: > Hi, > > After a customer query likely coming from erroneous Security Scanner output, > > this issue from 2002 has no CVE id yet as far as I see: > > http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/464113 > > It describes a problem where firewalls might let some TCP flags combinations > pass (e.g. all with RST flag set) and the OS (e.g. Linux) stack would in turn > accept a TCP session it might not have accepted otherwise. > > The protection added in Linux 2.4.20 is checking for the RST (reset) flag > when a SYN packet is received, which was I think the main attack scenario. > > The relevant part of the 2.4.20 patch is: > > @@ -3667,6 +3693,9 @@ > if(th->ack) > return 1; > > + if(th->rst) > + goto discard; > + > if(th->syn) { > if(tp->af_specific->conn_request(sk, skb) < 0) > return 1; > > > The check still exists in current mainline git, so the issue is still fixed. > > Ciao, Marcus I suspect that this actually came from here: http://www.nessus.org/plugins/index.php?view=single&id=11618 It's entirely possible that there's a typo in the web page because it talks about TCP+FIN but refers to web pages dealing with the much older TCP+RST. There is actually a SYN+FIN discard fix in the mainline kernel which would appear to be a DoS ("Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his linux machines to their limits.") should we have a CVE for this issue? (I'll ask in a separate message if so.) jch
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