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Message-ID: <4F90D383.2070303@redhat.com> Date: Thu, 19 Apr 2012 21:09:55 -0600 From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com CC: Marcus Meissner <meissner@...e.de>, security@...nel.org Subject: Re: CVE request: pid namespace leak in kernel 3.0 and 3.1 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 04/19/2012 03:48 PM, Marcus Meissner wrote: > Hi, > > we had a user, Vadim Ponomarev (ccrssaa at karelia.ru), report a > pid namespace leak caused by vsftpd. > > https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=757783 > > He provided a simple reproducer: > > #include <stdio.h> #include <errno.h> #include <signal.h> #include > <sched.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <unistd.h> #include > <sys/syscall.h> > > int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int i, ret; > > for (i = 0; i < 10000; i++) { > > if (0 == (ret = syscall(__NR_clone, CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWIPC | > CLONE_NEWNET | SIGCHLD, NULL))) return 0; > > if (-1 == ret) { perror("clone"); break; } > > } return 0; } > > > and checking "cat /proc/slabinfo|grep pid_namespace" gives 10000 > more active slots after running it on 3.0.13 (+SUSE patches) and > 3.1.10 (+SUSE patches). > > > Running this on 3.2.0 (+SUSE Patches) did not result in more slots, > so it was probably fixed between 3.1 and 3.2 (but someone else > cross check perhaps). > > Any idea welcome on which patch fixed this, I tried > 1b26c9b334044cff6d1d2698f2be41bc7d9a0864 but it seems not helping. > > Ciao, Marcus Can this be triggered by a non privileged user/process? Eugene mentions that CAP_SYS_ADMIN seems to be required, if so it seems like there isn't much of a trust boundary violation going on (anyone/thing with CAP_SYS_ADMIN is already in pretty good). - -- Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT) PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJPkNODAAoJEBYNRVNeJnmTAAYP/0L2MDtbhXSFOj6LpjhQfoa3 CmLYoY5E1rQHPJIFggc9FoMPeZKbEDyKGDwxV7LxdEz8g55nDu9tzZTbzFlbPo04 IxnI5YThwxYcgYQm+kwUp+kVxT2/NVLdEynPTSInJyTXW2p/twjn7D+F88U5ZSOS golUVRfJyigVCuHVYyK2Rcw6HXIsgjV6FjLm4pmQVAcfwuL32owUmw0d/CSmGnqI yIgNJYUc6DIQA0kDxJVLOBx1WcMGoxzf0UBFV9u6Gj4ucOtm92moBDKgR5+fymrR yN1UygKaisU3s0FNtmcSdyOiiypGN052bRBxpXC2rndt59IO/jxoRIWJGYN5txve adfcbty/XOOXCP4PMO2C81bEcF9VgQqaTE5RmcapJYBIMyI9LhbKtGr9aIR58TVE vjtlENFrF11jEPFKzPfVnqH0/e4i+nFRpX9gb3zR7rPgA6KH8ijKQzCEQf2sS5R0 X2EJHwj9BHNy+6P+xjXp1JpKXDVq0S9JtyyZVaGBzBOCBIW0QMtpSO84YaxmxbP9 /Tbt2FgKBGVvY6NpDMK6CsJ7jqSB6IHjJQSIKWbZpFghZgT1NMd4L3rpbwUIXyjJ 61utBIFfLAIDjqn2H0RQm1TRm+Ofzxc33qx7aNNRDIM4BGUqOcqB/dUlYDVoS/dL 5Wp58czyQo2nlJ73MAER =YakC -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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