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Message-Id: <20110407191737.B31D25653E@rebar.astron.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2011 15:17:37 -0400
From: christos@...las.com (Christos Zoulas)
To: Vincent Danen <vdanen@...hat.com>, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com,
file@...gw.com
Subject: Re: Possible security fixes in 5.05?
On Apr 7, 11:37am, vdanen@...hat.com (Vincent Danen) wrote:
-- Subject: Re: [oss-security] Possible security fixes in 5.05?
| Looks like there are a few issues here:
|
| 2011-01-16 19:31 Reuben Thomas <rrt at sc3d.org>
| * Fix two potential buffer overruns in apprentice_list.
|
| https://github.com/glensc/file/commit/148f1089b5c4f5ec5d51c2f147379817cb9ac47d
This is an order of evaluation issue, that could read memory over the allocated
limit. The limit check is done after the read instead of before. The code
has not been present in any release.
| 2010-09-20 15:24 Reuben Thomas <rrt at sc3d.org>
| * Minor security fix to softmagic.c (don't use untrusted
| string as printf format).
|
| https://github.com/glensc/file/commit/b05926f28f3cab0ef77101f89be154329dcb8dea
The code is present in [5.00-5.04]. It should not be an issue because the desc
printf formats are checked during parsing. It is mostly to silence a compiler
warning for printf(ms->desc) -> printf("%s", ms->desc). The code does
printf(ms->desc, argument) in a ton of other places.
christos
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