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Message-ID: <20080407162956.GA1025@suse.de>
Date: Mon, 7 Apr 2008 18:29:56 +0200
From: Marcus Meissner <meissner@...e.de>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: gcc 4.2 optimizations and integer overflow checks
On Mon, Apr 07, 2008 at 12:12:34PM -0400, Josh Bressers wrote:
> Has anyone started to look at this yet:
> http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/162289
>
> I suspect this isn't going to be trivial to detect. Ideas are welcome.
>
> Thanks.
Please note this section:
"Note: this issue does not strictly constitute a vulnerability in gcc
itself. The behavior that gcc exhibits in this case is permitted by the
ISO/IEC 9899:1999 C specification (ยง6.5.6p8). "
The gcc folks have discussed this to death already and in the discussion
the code received a -Wstrict-overflow option.
> cat xx.c
int f(int a, int b) {
return a < a+b;
}
int g(int a) {
return f(a,1<<30);
}
> LANG=C projects/gcc/BIN/bin/gcc -O2 -c xx.c -Wstrict-overflow -Wall
xx.c: In function 'g':
xx.c:2: warning: assuming signed overflow does not occur when assuming that (X + c) >= X is always true
Ciao, Marcus
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